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1 Introduction
In this paper we want to analyze the situation in which several voters must decide
whether to approve or not a given proposal. They actually have three options of vote,
either to vote “yes”, or to vote “no”, or else to vote for “abstention”. The final outcome
of the procedure is dichotomic – the proposal must be either approved or rejected. In
this context winning tripartitions, i.e., partitions of the set of players N made by three
elements suffice to describe the voting situation. Thus if (A,B,C) is such a partition,
this quite naturally means that if the voters in A are in favor, in B abstain, and in C
are contrary, then the proposal is approved. Analogously to simple voting games, in
this more general context minimal winning tripartitions suffice to describe the voting
rule; minimal winning in this context can be defined as a winning tripartition such
that moving in the right sense just one player makes automatically the new tripartition
loosing, i.e., non-winning.
The context of voting rules with abstention is considered in [Felsenthal et al. 1997]
and extended to voting rules with several ordered levels of approval in input and
output in [Freixas et al. 2003]. In this latter work, the notion of weighted voting
rule is settled, while the notion of the desirability relation was recently established
in [Freixas et al. 2014b]. The desirability relation entails the idea of power and tries
to compare the strength of each pair of voters. As proven in [Freixas et al. 2014b] the
only reasonable notion of desirability compatible with the notion of weighted voting
rules with abstention has two main components which induce two independent notions
of power.
A power index for voting rules with abstention that captures the essence of the
Banzhaf power index for simple voting games has been considered in [Felsenthal et al. 1998]
and extended to voting rules with multiple levels of approval in [Freixas 2005b], where
an axiomatization for the index was provided following the spirit of first Dubey and
Shapley’s axiomatization for the Banzhaf index in simple games. The idea of the ex-
tended index captures the probability for a player of being crucial in the game. However,
as it was already anticipated in [Freixas 2005b] expressing the power of the players by
means of a single real number does not explain in which way the voter is crucial. Indeed,
some voters can be very decisive in passing proposals, while not so in the defeating of
proposals. On the other hand, some players can be decisive in the opposite sense, or
some other players can be decisive in a more balanced way.
All these considerations led us to mainly pay attention to the notion of two com-
ponents power for voting rules with abstention rather than to the global notion of just
power as a single numerical allocation for each player. To justify this concept with a
pair of examples from other and somewhat esoteric comparisons we can for instance
think of the usual blood test to check cholesterol. A single number, the total cholesterol
present, can bring some information, but it is by far much more meaningful to know
both levels of the LDL and HDL cholesteroses. So that the total is just the sum of the
two. Or also, if you know the external temperature this helps in dressing you before
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going to the department, but perceived temperature and the chilling factor (that au-
tomatically provide you with the current external temperature), are more interesting
information.
Abstention plays a key role in almost all real voting systems that have been modeled
by simple voting games such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the
most important body in the international political system. The scholars of the period
accorded, see e.g. Straffin [Straffin 1982], pp. 314-315, that the Banzhaf ratio of power
between a permanent member and a non-permanent member is approximately 10 :
1. Felsenthal and Machover [Felsenthal et al. 1998], remarked that the simple voting
game modeling for the UNSC was based on the incorrect assumption that abstention
by a permanent member is tantamount to a ‘no” vote, having the effect of a veto.
Using the more realistic model with abstention, they get a Banzhaf ratio of power
of approximately 2 : 1. In this paper we go a step further in this analysis, since we
propose a 2-components decomposition of power for voting rules with abstention. Even
with abstention it is clear that non-permanent members have no power in defeating
proposals, but they play an apparent symmetrical role1 with permanent members in
making proposals to pass. However we will show that this apparent symmetry is not
appropriate and even for passing resolutions, permanent members are more powerful
than non-permanent members.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the remaining of this section we
formally introduce binary voting rules with abstention. Section 2 introduces the idea
of 2-components power and its simple conceptual relation with the Banzhaf extended
index for voting rules with abstention. Section 3 introduces some properties of power
indices for voting rules with abstention, with the purpose to provide, in Section 4, an
axiomatization of the three notions of power introduced in section 2. In Section 5 we
show that for weighted voting rules with abstention some properties for power indices
that naturally arise for weighted simple games are lost.The conclusion ends the paper.
1.1 The class of (3, 2) voting rules
The material on this section is essentially taken from Freixas and Zwicker [Freixas et al. 2003],
where (j, k) voting rules are introduced; here we consider only the case j = 3 and k = 2.
Before introducing the main notions we need some preliminary definitions. An ordered
tripartition of the finite set N is a triple S = (S1, S2, S3) of mutually disjoint sets
whose union is N . Any Si is allowed to be empty, and we think of Si as the set of
those voters of N who vote approval level i for the issue at hand (where approval level
1 is the highest level of approval, 2 is the intermediate level and 3 the lowest level).
The most relevant situation that happens in voting is when S1 correspond to the set
of ‘yes’ voters, S2 to the set of abstainers and S3 to the set of ‘no’ voters. Thus, an
ordered tripartition is the analogue of a coalition for a standard simple game. Let 3N
1If we modelize this example as a weighted game the weights for yes are the same, the details are
exposed in Example 1.3-(iii).
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denote the set of all ordered tripartitions of N . For S, T ∈ 3N , we write S ⊆3 T to
mean that either S = T or S may be transformed into T by shifting 1 or more voters
to higher levels of approval. This is the same as saying S1 ⊆ T1 and S2 ⊆ T1 ∪ T2;
we write S ⊂3 T if S ⊆3 T and S 6= T . The ⊆3 order defined on 3N has minimum:
the tripartition N such that N3 = N, and maximum: the tripartition M such that
M1 = N ; i.e., for every tripartition S, N ⊆3 S ⊆3M holds.
Definition 1.1 A (3, 2) simple game G = (N,V ) (henceforth (3, 2) game) consists of
a finite set N of voters together with a value function V : 3N −→ {1, 0}, with the
identifications 1 = win > lose = 0, V (N ) = 0, V (M) = 1 and which is monotonic:
for all ordered tripartitions S ⊆3 T then V (S) ≤ V (T ).
A (3, 2) game is also defined by the set of winning tripartitions W , and it satisfies
the monotonicity requirement: if S ⊂3 T and S ∈W then T ∈W .
SN will denote the class of (3, 2) games on the players set N .
Standard notions for coalitions in simple games naturally extend for tripartitions in
(3,2) games: S is a losing tripartition whenever V (S) = 0, L denotes the set of losing
tripartitions, S is a minimal winning tripartition provided that S is winning and that
T is a losing for each T ⊂3 S. The set of maximal losing tripartitions is analogously
defined. It is clear that W and L form a bipartition of 3N , and that each of the sets:
W , L, Wm, and Lm uniquely determine the (3, 2) game, where Wm, and Lm denote
the set of minimal winning and maximal loosing tripartitions.
Definition 1.2 Let G = (N,V ) be a (3, 2) game. A representation of G as a weighted
(3, 2) game consists of a triple w = (w1, w2, w3) of 3 weight functions, where wi :
N → R for each i and the weight functions satisfy the additional weight-monotonicity
requirement that for each p ∈ N , w1(p) ≥ w2(p) ≥ w3(p), together with a real number
quota Q such that for every tripartition S, V (S) = 1 if and only if w(S) ≥ Q, where
w(S) denotes
3∑
i=1
∑
p∈Si
wi(p).
We say that G = (N,V ) is a weighted (3, 2) game if it has such a representation.
As was observed in [Freixas et al. 2003], each ‘yes’ voter p contributes the weight
w1(p) to the total weight H; each abstainer p contributes w2(p) to H, and each ‘no’
voter p contributes w3(p) to H, with the issue passing exactly if H meets or exceeds
some preset quota Q. That is, before any voting takes place each voter is pre-assigned
three weights with w1(p) ≥ w2(p) ≥ w3(p) for each voter p. As occurs for simple
games where two weights represent superfluous information, three weights represent
superfluous information. If we renormalize by subtracting w2(p) from each of the
weights w1(p), w2(p) and w3(p) then the new triple of weights w
+(p) = w1(p)−w2(p),
0, and w−(p) = w3(p)−w2(p) describes the same voting system, and satisfies w+(p) ≥
0 ≥ w−(p). As a two components weight is enough for a (3, 2) weighted representation
4
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of a weighted game, it is intuitive that a two components vector of power might be
enough to explain power of voters in a (3, 2) game. We now describe some motivating
examples.
Example 1.3 (i) Let N = {a, b, c} be the set of players, Q = 1 the quota for a
weighted game with abstention, with respective weights w(a) = (1, 0, 0), w(b) =
(1, 0, 0), and w(c) = (0, 0,−2). If Q = 1, then (we omit brackets for the sake of
getting simpler notation) Wm = {(a, c, b), (b, c, a)}. In this game players a and
b play symmetrical roles and each one of them can make the proposal pass if c
does not cast a negative vote.Note that players a and b nothing can do to make
the proposal pass if c casts a negative vote. It seems obvious that players a and
b are equally powerful, however who is more powerful between a and c?
(ii) N = {a, b, c}, Q = 1, w(a) = (2, 0, 0), w(b) = (1, 0,−1), and w(c) = (0, 0,−2).
If Q = 1, then Wm = {(ab, ∅, c), (a, c, b), (b, c, a)}. Player c does not have any
influence to pass the proposal at hand, while player a cannot force the failure
of the proposal if the other two make it to pass. Player b is a middle on the
road player and seems to have influence in both sides. In this voting situation we
wonder: who is the most powerful voter?
Suppose that in this example we rise the quota from Q = 1 to Q = 2, or to Q = 3.
Who is the most powerful voter in all these contexts?
(iii) A resolution is carried in the Security Council if at least nine of its fifteen members
support it and no permanent member of the five is explicitly opposed. The formal
description of the UNSC as a (3, 2) game is as follows: let P and R be respectively
the set of permanent members and nonpermanent members, and
V (S) = V (S1, S2, S3) =
{
1 if |S1| ≥ 9 and S3 ∩ P = ∅
0 otherwise
This voting situation can be represented (see [Freixas et al. 2003]) by Q = 9,
w(p) = (1, 0,−6) for a permanent member p of the Council and w(r) = (1, 0, 0)
for a non-permanent member r of the Council. It is obvious that the permanent
members are more powerful than non-permanent members. However, is a perma-
nent member more powerful than a non-permanent member in making a proposal
to pass? This is questionable.
We observe that Examples 1.3 are weighted (3, 2) games. Later on, in Section 5, we
shall revisit the examples with the help of the index we introduce.
2 Towards a two components power index
To denote a (3, 2) simple game, in what follows we shall use the notation (N,V ) or
simply V if the set of players is clearly specified. We now introduce some further
5
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notation for tripartitions. Given (S1, S2, S3) a tripartition such that p /∈ S3, we define:
S↓p =
{
(S1 \ {p}, S2 ∪ {p}, S3) if p ∈ S1
(S1, S2 \ {p}, S3 ∪ {p}) if p ∈ S2
and if p ∈ S1
S↓↓p = (S1 \ {p}, S2, S3 ∪ {p}).
Analogous notation can be defined when a player p is moved in the left direction.
Thus, given (S1, S2, S3) with p /∈ S1, we define:
S↑p =
{
(S1 ∪ {p}, S2 \ {p}, S3) if p ∈ S2
(S1, S2 ∪ {p}, S3 \ {p}) if p ∈ S3
and if p ∈ S3
S↑↑p = (S1 ∪ {p}, S2, S3 \ {p}).
Definition 2.1 Let V ∈ SN , we say that for any tripartition S ∈ 3N :
1. p ∈ S1 is a YA-(down) swing in S if V (S) = 1 but V (S↓p) = 0. Analogously,
p ∈ S2 is a YA-(up) swing in S if V (S) = 0 but V (S↑p) = 1.
2. p ∈ S2 is a AN-(down) swing in S if V (S) = 1 but V (S↓p) = 0. Analogously,
p ∈ S3 is a AN-(up) swing in S if V (S) = 0 but V (S↑p) = 1.
3. p ∈ S1 is a YN-(down) swing in S if V (S) = 1 but V (S↓↓p) = 0. Analogously,
p ∈ S3 is a YN-(up) swing in S if V (S) = 0 but V (S↑↑p) = 1.
Since the number of X-down swings equals the number of the X-up swings, where
X stands for either Y A, AN or Y N , we simply consider from now on down swings and
call them simply swings.
Let us denote ηY Ap [V ], η
AN
p [V ], η
Y N
p [V ] respectively the number of swings of each type
for an arbitrary player p ∈ N .
Banzhaf’s (3, 2) extension Penrose [Penrose 1946] and Banzhaf [Banzhaf 1965] in-
dependently considered a very well recognized index for simple games. What is known
as Banzhaf’s ‘raw’ extended power index for a voter p ∈ N in a (3, 2) game V ∈ SN
is defined in [Felsenthal et al. 1997] (see also [Felsenthal et al. 1998]) and extended to
(j, k) games in [Freixas 2005b] as
ηp[V ] = η
Y A
p [V ] + η
AN
p [V ].
The raw extended Banzhaf index ηp[V ] counts the number of winning tripartitions in
which p is a swing descending one single level of approval.
By observing that
|{S : p ∈ S2, V (S) = 1, V (S↓p) = 0}| = |{S : p ∈ S1, V (S↓p) = 1, V (S↓↓p) = 0}|,
6
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we see that ηp[V ] is nothing more than η
Y N
p [V ] and thus
ηY Np [V ] = η
Y A
p [V ] + η
AN
p [V ]. (1)
The extended Banzhaf index to games with abstention, Ip[V ], can be directly inter-
preted as the probability of being decisive when the player is voting at the “yes”-level.
In fact,
Ip[V ] =
ηp[V ]
number of tripartitions with p ∈ S1 =
ηp[V ]
3|N |−1
(2)
The next definition naturally introduces some differentiated indices, two of them IY A
and IAN capture our idea of two components power on which we want to deepen in
this paper. The third index is nothing else than index I.
Definition 2.2 (X-component power). Consider the three power measures:
IXp [V ] =
ηXp [V ]
3|N |−1
(3)
where X stands for either Y A, AY, and Y N .
Note that IY N is the extended Banzhaf index for voting rules with abstention. Due
to (1) it is clear that only two of these indices really matter. Thus, we choose IY A
and IAN and just regard to IY N as the amalgamation of the two former indices. We
do claim that the pair of numbers (IY Ap , I
AN
p ) better captures the idea of power for a
player in a game with abstention. Due to (1), IY Np can be regarded as a ‘total power’
property for a player, that does not distinguish on the different types of being crucial
in the game.
3 Definitions and preliminaries for games with abstention
In this section we introduce some further material that will be needed for the main
result of the paper, i.e., an axiomatization of the two components power index. In
particular we introduce the definitions necessary to establish our axioms.
Definition 3.1 Let S 6= N be a tripartition, the S-unanimity game (N,US) is the
game whose only minimal winning tripartition is S.
Note that the unanimity games are the only games with a single minimal winning
tripartition. Other games have at least two.
The next definition focuses on dummy players, i.e., those players whose marginal
contribution play extreme roles.
Definition 3.2 Let V ∈ SN , voter p ∈ N is called a:
7
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1. Y A-dummy if V (S)−V (S↓p) = V (p, ∅, N \ p)−V (∅, p,N \ p) for all S ∈ 3N with
p ∈ S1.
2. AN -dummy if V (S)− V (S↓p) = V (∅, p,N \ p) for all S ∈ 3N with p ∈ S2.
3. Y N -dummy if V (S)− V (S↓↓p) = V (p, ∅, N \ p) for all S ∈ 3N with p ∈ S1.
A remark and some immediate consequences.
• We distinguish between two different types for p ∈ N of being X-dummy for each
X = Y A, AN , Y N :
1. p is an X-null player if the right-hand side expression in Definition 3.2 is 0.
2. p is an X-dictator if the right-hand side expression in Definition 3.2 is 1.
• Player p ∈ N in the (3, 2) game is
1. Y N -null if and only if it is both Y A-null and AN -null.
2. Y N -dictator if and only if p is either Y A-dictator and AN -null or is Y A-null
and AN -dictator.
• If a game V has an X-dictator, the rest of players are X-nulls.
The next definition concerns operations on (3, 2) games.
Definition 3.3 Given V1, V2 ∈ SN :
1. V1 ∨ V2 is the game such that (V1 ∨ V2)(S) = max{V1(S), V2(S)}
2. V1 ∧ V2 is the game such that (V1 ∧ V2)(S) = min{V1(S), V2(S)}
Thus, in order to win in V1 ∨ V2, a tripartition must win in either V1 or in V2, whereas
to win in V1 ∧ V2, a tripartition must win in both V1 and V2.
Note that ∧ is a closed operation inside the set of unanimity games. Indeed, UR ∧
US = UT where p ∈ Ti if i = min{j, k}, p ∈ Rj , and p ∈ Sk where j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The two next definitions give two different ways to reduce a game when two players
decide to vote together as a single one. In the first version the merge is produced at
the highest level of approval (of the two involved players) for each tripartition, while
in the second version the merge is produced as close as possible to the abstention level
for each tripartition.
Starting from a given set N of players and a given (3, 2) game (N,V ), the idea is
to construct a new set of players N ′ and two new (3, 2) games (N ′, V ′) and (N ′, V ′′) in
the following way. We imagine that there are two players, say p, r in N and we imagine
that player r merges in p to obtain the new set of players N ′ = (N \{p, r})∪{pr}. The
two next definitions capture two possible ways for the merge of players p and r.
8
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Definition 3.4 Let V ∈ SN . The voting game at the highest level of approval is the
pair (N ′, V ′) such that a winning tripartition S′ in game V ′ is constructed by a winning
tripartition S in game V in the following way:
1. if either p or r belong to S1, then
S′1 = (S1 \ {p, r}) ∪ {pr}, S′2 = S2 \ {p, r}, S′3 = S3 \ {p, r},
2. if both p and r belong to S3, then
S′1 = S1, S
′
2 = S2, S
′
3 = (S3 \ {p, r}) ∪ {pr},
3. if either p or r belong to S2 but neither p nor r belong to S1, then
S′1 = S1, S
′
2 = (S2 \ {p, r}) ∪ {pr}, S′3 = S3 \ {p, r}.
Definition 3.5 Let V ∈ SN . The voting game at the intermediate level of approval
is the pair (N ′, V ′′) such that a winning tripartition S′′ in game V ′′ is constructed by a
winning tripartition S in game V in the following way:
1. if both p and r belong to S1, then
S′′1 = (S1 \ {p, r}) ∪ {pr}, S′′2 = S2, S′′3 = S3,
2. if both p and r belong to S3, then
S′′1 = S1, S
′′
2 = S2, S
′′
3 = (S3 \ {p, r}) ∪ {pr},
3. if either p or r belong to S2 then
S′′1 = S1 \ {p, r}, S′′2 = (S2 \ {p, r}) ∪ {pr}, S′′3 = S3 \ {p, r}.
The two reduced games are well-defined, in the sense that they satisfy the requirements
for a (3, 2) game in Definition 1.1.
Note that a relationship for the (3, 2) games (N ′, V ′) and (N ′, V ′′) obtained from
(N,V ) is: V ′(S) ≤ V ′′(S) for all S ∈ 3N ′ . Thus, (N ′, V ′) is more stringent than
(N ′, V ′′) in making collective proposals to win. For instance, assume N = {p, r} and
V = U(p,r,∅) then N ′ = {pr} and V ′ = U(pr,∅,∅) while V ′′ = U(∅,pr,∅).
3.1 Axioms
We are now in a position to present sets of three axioms suitable to single out IY Ap and
IANp appearing in (1) as the power indices Pp : SN → R+ for the family (3, 2) games
(with N as set of players).2 In what follows we shall use X for a choice between Y A
2In the Conclusion section we shall say something about axiomatization of IY Np .
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and AN , whenever nothing changes when using one of them rather the other one.
The first axiom shows that the sum of powers of voter p in the games V1∨V2 and V1∧V2
is equal to the sum of powers in V1 and V2, so that power is transferred in these games.
This is an adaptation, to our context, of the same well known axiom in the context of
classical simple games. This axiom (and the second one to be introduced later) was
already considered for (3, 2) games in [Freixas 2005a] and in [Freixas 2005b].
Axiom 1 (Transfer) For V1, V2 ∈ SN ,
Pp[V1 ∨ V2] + Pp[V1 ∧ V2] = Pp[V1] + Pp[V2]. (4)
The idea of the next axiom, which makes a specification about maximal and minimal
power specification in different situations X, i.e., a X-dictator should posses maximum
power in the game as she can be characterized as the only non-X-null voter. On
the other hand X-null voters should have minimum power with respect to non-X-null
voters. These two extreme measures of power are quantified here by 1 and 0 respectively,
but arbitrary choices could be considered instead.
Axiom 2 (Extreme power specification): Let V ∈ SN . If the voter p is:
(i) either a Y A-null player or a Y A-dictator in V , then
Pp[V ] = V (p, ∅, N \ p)− V (∅, p,N \ p), (5)
(ii) either an AN -null player or an AN -dictator in V , then
Pp[V ] = V (∅, p,N \ p), (6)
(iii) either a Y N -null player or a Y N -dictator in V , then
Pp[V ] = V (p, ∅, N \ p). (7)
Axiom 2 can be regarded as a normalization axiom in which the two bounds for
extreme power are specified.
The third axiom shows the relationship between the power of a member and the
power of that member after forming a block in each of the two reduced games considered
in definitions 3.4 and 3.5.
Axiom 3 (Individual block effect) Let V = US ∈ SN .
(i) Let V ′ ∈ SN ′ be the (3, 2) game obtained from V when the voters p, r ∈ N form
a block pr at the highest level of approval. Suppose moreover p ∈ S1. Then
1. if r ∈ S1, then Ppr[V ′] = 3Pp[V ],
2. if r ∈ S2, then Ppr[V ′] = (3/2)Pp[V ],
10
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3. if r ∈ S3, then Ppr[V ′] = Pp[V ].
(ii) Let V ′′ ∈ SN ′ be the (3, 2) game obtained from game V ∈ SN above, when
the voters p, r ∈ N form a block pr at the intermediate level of approval, where
V = US and p ∈ S2. Then
1. r ∈ S1, then Ppr[V ′′] = 3Pp[V ],
2. r ∈ S2, then Ppr[V ′′] = (3/2)Pp[V ],
3. r ∈ S3, then Ppr[V ′′] = Pp[V ].
(iii) Let V ′′′ ∈ SN ′ be the (3, 2) game obtained from game V ∈ SN above, when the
voters p, r ∈ N form a block pr: at the highest level of approval if p ∈ S1, and at
the intermediate level of approval if p ∈ S2. Then
1. r ∈ S1, then Ppr[V ′′′] = 3Pp[V ],
2. r ∈ S2, then Ppr[V ′′′] = (3/2)Pp[V ],
3. r ∈ S3, then Ppr[V ′′′] = Pp[V ].
For instance, forming a block at the highest level (the same for the intermediate
level) between p ∈ S1 and r ∈ N in the S-unanimity game US means for p a collective
gain of the triple3 if r is also a yes-voter in S, a collective gain of just 1.5 times4 if r is
an abstainer in S, while no gain is obtained if r is a no-voter in S.
Note that the action of power Pp over the S-unanimity game US as defined in A3-(i)
coincides with the action of power as defined in A3-(iii) whenever p ∈ S1. Similarly,
the action of power Pp over the S-unanimity game US as defined in A3-(ii) coincides
with the action of power as defined in A3-(iii) whenever p ∈ S2.
4 A characterization theorem
In this section we state the main results of the paper. They are axiomatic characteri-
zations of the indices.
Theorem 4.1 A power index Pp satisfies axioms A1, A2-(i), and A3-(i) if and only
if Pp is the index I
Y A
p in (3).
Theorem 4.2 A power index Pp satisfies axioms A1, A2-(ii), and A3-(ii) if and only
if Pp is the index I
AN
p in (3).
3Note that for the Banzhaf index for simple games the gain is just the double. The multiplier effect
is 2 for simple games which coincides with the levels of approval 2, while for games with abstention the
multiplier effect is 3 which coincides with number of levels of approval. For (j, 2) games the multiplier
effect would be j.
4i.e., the half of the number of input levels.
11
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
We are going to prove only the first theorem because, essentially, the same proof can
be given to the second one.
Proof. We will first show that IY Ap satisfies axioms A1, A2-(i), and A3-(i). Let us
start by seeing A1. We only need to prove
ηY A[V1 ∨ V2] + ηY A[V1 ∧ V2] = ηY A[V1] + ηY A[V2]. (8)
Consider the following sets of tripartitions:
X = {S ∈ 3N : p ∈ S1} ∩ {S ∈W1 \W2, Sp↓ /∈W1},
Y = {S ∈ 3N : p ∈ S1} ∩ {S ∈W2 \W1, Sp↓ /∈W2},
Z1 = {S ∈ 3N : p ∈ S1} ∩ {S ∈W1 ∩W2, Sp↓ /∈W1, Sp↓ ∈W2},
Z2 = {S ∈ 3N : p ∈ S1} ∩ {S ∈W1 ∩W2, Sp↓ ∈W1, Sp↓ /∈W2},
Z3 = {S ∈ 3N : p ∈ S1} ∩ {S ∈W1 ∩W2, Sp↓ /∈W1, Sp↓ /∈W2}.
Clearly,
1. the sets X, Z1, and Z3 form a partition of the set of YA-swings of p in V1,
2. the sets Y , Z2, and Z3 form a partition of the set of YA-swings of p in V2,
3. the sets X, Y , Z1, Z2, and Z3 form a partition of the set of YA-swings of p in
V1 ∨ V2,
4. the set Z3 coincides with the set of YA-swings of p in V1 ∧ V2.
To check that IY Ap satisfies A2-(i), note that if p is Y A-dictator it means (see Defini-
tion 3.2-1) that V = U(p,∅,N\p) which implies ηY Ap [V ] = 3n−1 and from (3) IY Ap [V ] = 1,
while r is an AY-null player if r 6= p and therefore ηY Ar [V ] = IY Ar [V ] = 0.
Note that if p is a Y A-null player it means (see Definition 3.2-1) that p /∈ S1 for all
tripartitions S ∈Wm which implies ηY Ap [V ] = IY Ap [V ] = 0.
Finally, to verify A3-(i) for IY Ap , let G = (N,V ) be such that V = US and p ∈ S1.
Let G′ = (N ′, V ′) be the (3, 2) game introduced in Definition 3.4-1.
The set of tripartitions in which p is a Y A-swing for V is P = {T ∈ 3N : S ⊆3 T},
i.e., tripartitions in which all players vote either in the same level of approval or in
a higher level. Let |Si| = si for i = 2, 3 and |N | = n, then ηY Ap [V ] = |P| and as
|P| = 2s2 · 3s3 , it follows IY Ap [V ] = 2s2 · 3s3+1−n.
Consider now G′ = (N ′, V ′) which is the S′-unanimity game V ′ = US′ with S′ given
as in Definition 3.4-1 with pr ∈ S′1. We can perform similar computations to obtain:
ηY Apr [V
′] =

2s2 · 3s3 if r ∈ S1
2s2−1 · 3s3 if r ∈ S2
2s2 · 3s3−1 if r ∈ S3
12
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Hence,
IY Apr [V
′] =

2s2 · 3s3+2−n if r ∈ S1
2s2−1 · 3s3+2−n if r ∈ S2
2s2 · 3s3+1−n if r ∈ S3
and A3-(i) is verified.
Let us now prove that if a power index Pp that satisfies properties A1, A2-(i), and
A3-(i), then it must be IY Ap . First observe that any Pp is uniquely determined by its
action on unanimity games. Indeed, suppose the set of minimal winning tripartitions
in V is Wm = {S1, . . . , Sr}. Then we can write
V = US1 ∨ US2 ∨ · · · ∨ USr ,
and by A1 the conclusion follows. Now, let us proceed by induction on the number r of
winning tripartitions. If k = 1 then V is itself a unanimity game and so the conclusion
is obvious. If k > 1, then V can be written as
V = U ∨ USk ,
where U = US1 ∨ US2 ∨ · · · ∨ USk−1 . Therefore, by the distributive law:
U ∧ USk = (US1 ∧ USk) ∨ · · · ∨ (USk−1 ∧ USk) = UT1 ∨ · · · ∨ UTk−1
where Ti (i = 1, . . . , k − 1) is the tripartition obtained from Si and Sk as described in
Definition 3.3. According to the transfer axiom, it follows that
Pp[V ] = Pp[U ] + Pp[USk ]− Pp[U ∧ USk ]
= Pp[US1 ∨ · · · ∨ USk−1 ] + Pp[USk ]− Pp[UT1 ∨ · · · ∨ UTk−1 ]
so that the claim readily follows from the inductive hypothesis. Thus IY Ap is uniquely
determined by its values on unanimity games. Let us obtain these 3n − 1 values by
induction on the number of players |N | = n. Assume |N | = 1 and p ∈ N , then there are
just two (unanimity) games: U(p,∅,∅) and U(∅,p,∅); in the former case p is a Y A-dictator,
while in the second one p is a YA-null. Thus by A2-(i)
P Y Ap (U(p,∅,∅)) = 1 = 1/3
|N |−1 (9)
and
P Y Ap (U(∅,p,∅)) = 0. (10)
Hence, P Y A is completely determined when |N | = 1 and it coincides with IY A.
So assume |N | > 1. Let p 6= r be two voters in N , consider V = US an arbitrary
S-unanimity game and the game (N ′, V ′) as defined in Definition 3.4. Assume:
1. {p, r} ∩ S1 = ∅. In this case, both p and r are Y A-null voters and therefore by
A2-(i), P Y Ap [V ] = P
Y A
r [V ] = 0 ∀p, r /∈ S1.
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2. {p, r} ∩ S1 6= ∅. Then assume, w.l.o.g., that p ∈ S1. From A3-(i) it follows that:
(a) if r ∈ S1, then P Y Ap [V ] = (1/3)P Y Apr [V ′],
(b) if r ∈ S2, then P Y Ap [V ] = (2/3)P Y Apr [V ′],
(c) if r ∈ S3, then P Y Ap [V ] = P Y Apr [V ′].
Thus by the inductive assumption the right-hand side expressions are determined,
and also P Y Ar [V ] = (1/3)P
Y A
pr [V
′] when r ∈ S1. Thus,
P Y Ap [V ] = P
Y A
r [V ] ∀ p, r ∈ S1
and
P Y Ap [V ] = P
Y A
r [V ] = 0 ∀ p, r ∈ S2 ∪ S3.5
This ends the proof. 
Remark 4.3 1. Note that equations (9) and (10) for one-player (3, 2) games de-
rived from A2-(i) have analogous versions if, instead, we consider A2-(ii) or
A2-(iii) respectively. By A2-(ii),
PANp (U(p,∅,∅)) = 0, (11)
and
PANp (U(∅,p,∅)) = 1 = 1/3
|N |−1. (12)
Hence, PAN is completely determined when |N | = 1 and it coincides with IAN .
By A2-(iii)
P Y Np (U(p,∅,∅)) = 1 = 1/3
|N |−1, (13)
and
P Y Np (U(∅,p,∅)) = 1 = 1/3
|N |−1. (14)
Hence, P Y N is completely determined when |N | = 1 and it coincides with IY N .
It follows that IY Np over unanimity games is given by
IY Np [US ] =

2s2 · 3s3+1−n if p ∈ S1
2s2−1 · 3s3+1−n if p ∈ S2
0 otherwise
We conclude by showing that all axioms are needed to identify the indices. We
only prove the result for the Y A-version since the result for the AN -version is, mutatis
mutandis, the same.
5This shows that the null-axiom and the reduced axiom at the highest level imply Y A-equal treat-
ment on unanimity games, which by transfer can be extended to all games. Y A-equal treatment for
the (3, 2) game V and players p, r ∈ N means that PY Ap [V ] = PY Ar [V ] whenever V (S) − V (Sp↓) =
V (S) − V (Sr↓) for all tripartitions S ∈ 3N with p, r ∈ S1. Analogously, one may consider Y N - and
AN -equal treatment with the corresponding implications.
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Theorem 4.4 Axioms A1, A2-(i), and A3-(i) are independent.
Theorem 4.5 Axioms A1, A2-(ii), and A3-(ii) are independent.
Proof. The index given by
Ip[V ] =

ηY Ap [V ]
3|N |−1
if V = US for some tripartition S
(
ηY Ap [V ]
3|N |−1
)2
if V 6= US
where |N | > 1, is nonlinear in ηY Ap , and thus it fails to satisfy the transfer axiom A1,
but it satisfies A2-(i) and A3-(i).
Since the index
Jp[V ] = k · IY Ap [V ],
for some k ≥ 0, k 6= 1, is not appropriately normalized, it violates A2-(i) whenever p is
a YA-dictator, while it satisfies A1 and A3-(i) and A2-(i) for null players.
The index
Kp[V ] = I
Y N
p [V ]
satisfies A1 and A3-(i). Moreover, if p is a YA-dictator then p is a YN-dictator as
well. Hence, K satisfies A2-(i) for dictators, whereas if p is a YA-null player, p is not
necessarily a YN-null player and therefore A2-(i) fails for null players.
Finally, let V be a (3, 2) game, consider the power index B for (3, 2) games that
applies to V in the following way. Consider for V an associated simple game v with
the same set of players N which is uniquely determined by the winning coalitions as
follows. Coalition S1 6= ∅ is winning in v if and only if tripartition S = (S1, N \ S1, ∅)
is winning in V , and v(∅) = 0. The simple game (N, v) is well-defined since: v(N) = 1,
v(∅) = 0, and v is monotonic. If Bz denotes the Banzhaf index for simple games, we
take
Bp[V ] = Bzp[v].
B satisfies the transfer axiom since Bz for simple games does so. If p is a Y A-null
player in V it means that p /∈ S1 for all S ∈ Wm, hence p does not belong to any
minimal winning coalition in v as well. Thus, Bzp[v] = 0 and therefore Bp[V ] = 0.
If p is a Y A-dictator it means that V = U(p,∅,N\p), hence p is a dictator for v as
well. Thus, Bzp[v] = 1 and therefore Bp[V ] = 1.
However, B does not satisfy A3-(i) since for example Bp[UM] = Bzp[uN ] = 21−n,
while Bpr[UM′ ] = Bzpr[uN ′ ] = 22−n where p, r ∈ S1 ⊆ N and uS denotes the
S-unanimity game of coalition S for simple games. Thus, 22−n = Bpr[UM′ ] = 2Bp[UM] 6=
3Bp[UM]. 
15
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
ηY A ηAN ηY N
U(a,c,b) (6,0,0) (0,0,3) (6,0,3)
U(b,c,a) (0,6,0) (0,0,3) (0,6,3)
U(ab,c,∅) (2,2,0) (0,0,1) (2,2,1)
U(a,c,b) ∨ U(b,c,a) (4,4,0) (0,0,5) (4,4,5)
Table 1: Raw indices for Example 1.3-(i).
We conclude this section by revisiting the first example considered.
Example 1.3-(i) (revisited). Since IX [U(a,c,b) ∨U(b,c,a)] = IX [U(a,c,b)] + IX [U(b,c,a)]−
IX [U(a,c,b) ∧ U(b,c,a)] and U(a,c,b) ∧ U(b,c,a) = U(ab,c,∅) by the transfer axiom we obtain
the value of IX for the game by its action on unanimity games. As the denominator is
constant we just consider ηX instead of IX for the three possible choices of X. The next
table summarizes the results. Thus, clearly c is null from the viewpoint of Y A-power,
while a and b are nulls for Y N -power. When the amalgamation of the two versions of
power into Y N -power is produced, player c becomes one more time crucial than players
a or b, and thus a bit more powerful, e.g., the difference of YN-power between c and a
is 1/9. Table 1 contains the raw indices.
5 A remark on the rankings of power in comparing two
different weighted (3,2) games
In weighted simple games it is well-known that if two players have in a weighted rep-
resentation the same weights then they are equally powerful for all symmetric power
indices, including the Banzhaf power index. In weighted games with abstention and for
the three power indices considered in this paper this property is still (trivially) true.
For instance, in the previous example players a and b have the same X-power.
If (q;w) ≡ [q;w1, w2, . . . , wn] is a weighted representation of a weighted simple
game and (q′;w) is another representation of another weighted simple game with equal
weights but different quota, then the rankings of the Banzhaf index for players cannot
be opposite, i.e. it is not possible to have
Bzp(q;w) > Bzr(q;w) and Bzp(q
′;w) < Bzr(q′;w).
This is true because having more weight than another player in a weighted repre-
sentation means being crucial at least as many times as the player with less weight.
This property is satisfied by the Banzhaf, the Shapley-Shubik (see [Diffo Lambo 2002])
and Johnston (see [Freixas et al. 2012]) indices, but not by some other indices, like
the Holler or Deegan and Packel indices (see e.g. [Holler 2001] or [Holler et al. 2004]).
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ηY A ηAN ηY N
U(ab,∅,c) (3,3,0) (0,0,0) (3,3,0)
U(a,c,b) (3,0,0) (0,0,3) (3,0,3)
U(b,c,a) (0,3,0) (0,0,3) (0,3,3)
U(ab,c,∅) (2,2,0) (0,0,1) (2,2,1)
U(ab,∅,c) ∨ U(a,c,b) ∨ U(b,c,a) (2,2,0) (0,0,4) (2,2,4)
Table 2: The raw indices for Example 1.3-(ii) and Q = 1.
Thus, if in a weighted representation of a simple game the quota is increased (or de-
creased) the Banzhaf power of two arbitrary players cannot be reversed.
The next example, which is also useful to revise the properties considered in the
previous sections, illustrates that the natural extension of the Banzhaf index for games
with abstention, IY Np fails to fulfill this property.
Example 1.3-(ii) (revisited): Let N = {a, b, c}, w(a) = (2, 0, 0), w(b) = (1, 0,−1), and
w(c) = (0, 0,−2).
• Consider Q = 1. Then Wm = {(ab, ∅, c), (a, c, b), (b, c, a)}. It holds that
IX [U(ab,∅,c) ∨ U(a,c,b) ∨ U(b,c,a)] = IX [U(ab,∅,c)] + IX [U(a,c,b)] + IX [U(b,c,a)]
−2IX [U(ab,c,∅)]
since
U(ab,∅,c) ∧ U(a,c,b) = U(ab,c,∅)
U(ab,∅,c) ∧ U(b,c,a) = U(ab,c,∅)
U(a,c,b) ∧ U(b,c,a) = U(ab,c,∅)
and
U(ab,∅,c) ∧ U(a,c,b) ∧ U(b,c,a) = U(ab,c,∅).
Thus we can obtain by the transfer property the values of IX for the game by its action
on unanimity games. Table 2 contains the raw indices.
Concerning YN-power c is doubly powerful than a and b which are equally powerful.
Note that a does not benefit with respect to b of having a greater “yes”-weight.
• Consider Q = 2. Then Wm = {(a, bc, ∅)}.
As illustrated in Table 3 voter a is by far the most powerful while b cannot benefit
of her positive “yes”-weight.
• Consider Q = 3. Then Wm = {(ab, c, ∅)}.
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ηY A ηAN ηY N
U(a,bc,∅) (4,0,0) (0,2,2) (4,2,2)
Table 3: The raw indices for Example 1.3-(iii) and Q = 2.
ηY A ηAN ηY N
U(ab,c,∅) (2,2,0) (0,0,1) (2,2,1)
Table 4: The raw indices for Example 1.3-(iii) and Q = 3.
As illustrated in Table 4 the “yes”-weights and “no”-weights for a and b produce
the same effect in the game. An effect on decisiveness which is not compensated by the
“YN”-power of c.
Thus, when simply considering these three quotas the rankings obtained for the
Y N -power are all different (see Table 5).
Indeed, this example illustrates a different behavior of the index IY N for (3, 2)
games and the Banzhaf index for simple games. If we compare players b and c in the
three previous games for Q = 1, Q = 2, and Q = 3 we observe that the three rankings
of power for IY N and players b and c are: b < c, b = c, and b > c respectively.
One might expect that if two players have the same weight to vote affirmatively
(or negatively) then they should have the same power to pass (veto) resolutions. For
instance, in the weighted representation of the UNSC voting system with abstention
giving in Example 1.3-(iii) all players, permanent and non-permanent, have the same
“yes” which is 1. Should be expected that they have the same YA-power, IY A?
Q = 1 Q = 2 Q = 3
Ranking for YN-power c > a = b a > b = c a = b > c
Table 5: Rankings of power for different quotas in Example 1.3-(ii).
18
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Example 1.3-(iii) (revisited): Some computations to get the swings lead us to
ηY Ap [V ] =
4∑
j=0
(
4
j
) · ( 108−j) ·
[
2+j∑
k=0
(
2+j
k
)]
= 69876
ηY Ar [V ] =
5∑
j=0
(
5
j
) · ( 98−j) ·
[
1+j∑
k=0
(
1+j
k
)]
= 53154
ηANp [V ] =
4∑
j=0
j∑
k=0
(
4
j−k
) · ( 1010−k)2k + 4∑
k=0
(
4
4−k
)(
10
10−k−1
)
21+k = 38460
and as players r ∈ R are AN -nulls it holds ηANr [V ] = 0. From this we obtain:
IY Ap [V ] = 0.01460833575, I
AN
p [V ] = 0.0080410306, I
Y N
p [V ] = 0.02265036633,
IY Ar [V ] = 0.01111318096, I
AN
r [V ] = 0, I
Y N
r [V ] = 0.01111318096.
so that the answer to the question posed is negative. Even for passing resolutions,
permanent members are more powerful than non-permanent members.
Clearly, in weighted games with abstention IY A power depends not only on the
affirmative weights of players, but also on the weights against.
We finally conclude by just recalling that some authors (see [Parker 2012] and [Tchantcho et al. 2008])
have proved that the IY N power index respects the I-influence, an extension of the de-
sirability relation for simple games. However, not all weighted games are I-complete,
i.e., games for which the I-influence is a total pre-ordering. Thus, their studies for IY N
power cannot be extended to all weighted (3, 2) games.
Furthermore IY A respects theDY A-desirability relation, IAN respects theDAN -desi-
rability relation, and IY N respects the DY N -desirability relation, the three desirability
relations are introduced in [Freixas et al. 2014a] and are of fundamental importance for
the consistency of the notion of weighted voting rule with abstention. The DY A-desi-
rability relation formalizes the intuitive notion that is the basis of the expression: “p
has at least as Y A-power as r” and it is formalized in terms of the formation of win-
ning tripartition when swamping the voter from the abstention level to the yes level.
Analogous intuition underlies under the other two relations: DAN and DY N . However,
the equation 1 leaves only two degrees of freedom and two components power measure,
we have chosen IY A and IAN , are necessary instead of only one, let’s say IY N .
6 Conclusion
The notion of two components power for voting rules with abstention, or simply (3, 2)
games, is introduced in this paper. It is compatible with the two components desirabil-
ity relation considered in [Freixas et al. 2014b] which is also compatible with the notion
of weighted voting rule with abstention. These two components of power have an in-
dependent but complementary meaning to explain the real ex-ante power that a player
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has in a (3, 2) game. We think we have shown evidence that a classical power measure
assigning a single number to each player in a (3, 2) game is not enough to understand
how influent a player is in the situations described by (3, 2) games, and in which way
is influent in such games. The corresponding generalization of the Banzhaf index in
the context of (3, 2) games is just the sum of the components of the two components
vector considered in this paper.
To add theoretical robustness to this new notion in the paper we provided also
an axiomatization of the most natural two components power index. We conclude by
observing that our axiomatization of the two components can be easily extended to the
generalized Banzhaf index just observing that all properties extend, mutatis mutandis,
to sums.6 The only point to put in evidence is now that in Axiom 2 the required
normalization conditions must be written as in (7) instead of its similar versions in (5)
or (6), and similarly occurs with Axiom 3. Thus it holds:
Theorem 6.1 A power index Pp satisfies axioms A1, A2-(iii), and A3-(iii) if and only
if Pp is the index I
Y N
p in (3).
Several axiomatizations for the Banzhaf index in simple games exist (see among oth-
ers, [Albizuri et al. 2001, Barua 2005, Feltkamp 1995, Haller 1994, Lehrer 1988, Owen 1978]).
All of them have been very useful to better understand this power index and to highlight
different features for it. Our notion of two components power index needs the support
of similar characterizations. We point out a certain similarity between our block axiom
and the corresponding axiom considered in [Barua 2005]. Apparently some quite close
connections might exist between some of these axiomatizations for simple games and
new axiomatizations for our idea of 2-components power.
It is also remarkable that other notions of games with alternatives exist in the litera-
ture trying to extend values for cooperative games to these larger classes of games, we re-
fer among others to [Amer 1998, Carreras 1998, Bolger 1986, Bolger 1993, Bolger 2000,
Ono 2001]. All these models do not assume an ordering for the input and output levels
as we do. However, they admit restrictions to some voting rules with ordered levels. In
this context, our approach is still valid in these models.
While a power index for a simple game or a value for cooperative game gives a total
ranking for players in the game, the idea introduced here of 2-components power for
games with abstention or (3, 2)-games (or more generally (j − 1)-components power
for (j, 2) games) loses this property since the 2-components power of two players need
not to be Pareto comparable. This enforces the analysis of importance rankings in
this more complex framework, which is also a significant issue in operational research.
The approach in our paper is useful in ranking voters in voting institutions where ab-
stention is allowed as a third input. Examples of application of our results naturally
apply to political institutions, but also in management enterprisers and even in relia-
bility systems where voters are replaced by device components with three input levels.
6Also a direct verification is quite straightforward, following the lines of our previous proofs.
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Examples of the treatment of the importance of rankings in these different contexts
can be found in: [Alonso-Meijide 2009, Bishnu 2012, Cook 2006, Freixas et al. 2014a,
Jones et al. 2010, Levitin 2003, Obata et al. 2003].
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